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More than two years after the 2015 earthquakes
devastated Nepal, Katunge village in Dhading
district, Nepal, remained as destroyed as it was
right after the earthquake. While the villagers
were rather hopeful about rebuilding their
houses and lives during the immediate relief
effort in which we engaged, one month after the
earthquake, now only a few are confident that
they will ever rebuild their homes.

gain insight into broader perspectives on the
community or family-level realities that hinder
rebuilding and community revitalization. We
conclude that by mobilizing earthquake victims,
it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize
communities. Conversely, little progress can be
expected in Nepal’s rebuilding as long as poor
governance and poor coordination between
major reconstruction actors prevails.

In this article, we describe the reconstruction
progress, followed by a critique of why the
reconstruction progress has been so slow. We
conclude with reflections on reconstruction
challenges interwoven into the context of
our NGO experience. During our trips to the
region, we have observed and experienced the
difficulties people and organizations are facing
in the reconstruction process. We interviewed
government officials and NGOs that have been
involved in reconstruction, which helped us to

Keywords: Nepal earthquake, post-disaster relief and recovery,
governance, NGOs, reconstruction.
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Introduction
As we walked through Katunge village in Nepal’s Dhading
district, nearly 18 months after the Spring 2015 earthquakes that devastated Nepal, we saw that the village was
still as broken and shattered as when we saw it for the
first time after the earthquake. Everywhere we went, we
saw piles of bricks, debris and houses that were either
collapsed or showed cracks and gaping holes. Nearly all
of the families were still living in semi-temporary shelters, mostly made of wood with tin roofs, and often built
next to their collapsed houses. We visited several families
living in shelters, and they described the hardships they
have been enduring since the earthquake. Many talked
about how difficult life is in the shelters, with leaking and
draughty roofs, lack of space, and improper sanitation. It
was not difficult for us to imagine how hard life is for the
villagers; during several of our field trips we made to the
village we experienced ourselves how hot it can be in the
shelters during the summer, and how cold and wet during
the monsoon season. In our discussions with the villagers, the way people talked about their future significantly
changed since our last visit, just a few months ago. While
the villagers were rather hopeful about rebuilding their
houses and lives when we met them one month after the
earthquake, now only a few are confident that they will
ever rebuild their homes. This is a description of our latest
trip to Katunge village and several other places in Nepal in
September 2016.
Having been involved for years with a grassroots NonGovernmental Organization (NGO) called Future Village,
we decided to provide emergency relief and establish
a reconstruction project in our project area, Katunge
village, in Dhading district.1 While prior to the earthquake
our NGO mainly focused on providing free education
and health care to the most disadvantaged families in
the village, our efforts after the earthquake focused on
supporting and assisting all affected families. Since the
earthquake we have made several visits to Nepal to contribute to the project and to study the post-earthquake
situation. During our trips, we have observed and experienced the difficulties people and organizations are facing
as they try to rebuild, and have spoken to several government officials and NGOs that have been involved in the
reconstruction.
In this article, we discuss our perspectives on the reasons
why the reconstruction progress in Nepal has been slow;
we focus on how Nepalese government and non-governmental organization actions have slowed the revitalization
process. We argue that the government’s inefficiency to
deliver funding and services to affected people, and its
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lack of coordination with NGOs in the aftermath of the
earthquake, are among the main reasons why the reconstruction progress has been impeded. This paper has
been written based on the observations we made during
our several trips, the discussions we had (as representatives of reconstruction projects) with government
officials and representatives of other NGOs, and our
first-hand experiences as members of an NGO involved
in reconstruction projects.
This article consists of three parts. First, we describe the
reconstruction progress. Second, we critically analyze why
the progress has been so slow. Third, we provide reflections on reconstruction challenges using our experience
working with NGOs.
Aspirations and Realities of Reconstruction
The descriptions of Katunge village provided earlier in this
paper do not differ much from post-earthquake situations
in the rest of affected areas in Nepal. In most places the
reconstruction progress has been slow. By the time the
earthquake marked its first anniversary, and media attention surrounding the rebuilding progress peaked, none
of the more than 800,000 houses damaged or destroyed
during the earthquake had been rebuilt by the government
(Rigby 2016). This left approximately three million people
without permanent shelter (Save the Children 2016). At
that time, most of these affected families were still living
in temporary shelter unsuitable for Nepal’s intense monsoons and cold winters. In some extreme cases, people
were even living in tents or had moved back into their
damaged houses (Basu 2016).
The slow reconstruction pace has been met with substantial criticism both inside and outside Nepal, and many
organizations, including donors, have urged the Nepali
government to expedite the reconstruction and the
distribution of grants (Nikhil 2016). Despite this pressure,
the reconstruction progress only started to accelerate
in August 2016, when a campaign was undertaken to
finally distribute the reconstruction grant installment of
NRs. 50,000 to the affected families that had signed grant
agreements. This long-awaited installment was part of a
series of installments that the Nepalese government had
promised to grant and distribute to all earthquake-affected
families that had applied for the grant and had signed the
necessary grant agreement. This grant agreement requires
affected families to rebuild an earthquake-resistant home
in accordance with government formulated standards to
receive further aid. More assessments were also conducted
in August to identify families who had been affected by the

earthquakes but had not been registered. Because of this
campaign, the number of households receiving the first
installment increased from 1,000 in June 2016 to 407,007
by the end of September 2016 (National Reconstruction
Authority 2016).
In terms of public facilities, the reconstruction progress
has been better, but can still be considered moderate.
During the earthquake, 21,169 classrooms were destroyed
and 27,452 classrooms were partially damaged. By the end
of September 2016, 8,856 of these classrooms were rebuilt
or were being rebuilt by the Nepali government or NGOs;
however, no clear plan had been implemented for rebuilding the remaining classrooms. Reconstruction of the health
facilities has also been slow, with construction only starting for 444 of the 1,080 destroyed health facilities by the
end of September 2016, and currently only 200 facilities
have been reopened. At the same time, construction has
only just begun for 49 of the 750 damaged cultural heritage sites, making problems worse for an already suffering
tourism industry (National Reconstruction Authority
2016).2
The lack of progress strongly contrasts with the promises
made during the conference of donors held in June 2015.
During this conference, donor countries pledged nearly 4.1
billion USD for the long-term recovery of Nepal, a level of
commitment that surprised many, and covers just under
half of the 9.18 billion USD the Nepali government now
expects will be needed to rebuild the country. In return,
the Nepali government promised to establish a national
reconstruction authority that would centrally organize all
the reconstruction efforts and ensure they are carried out
expeditiously and fairly. Indeed, the government was able
to rapidly map the needs and damage in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake and communicate those needs
to international donors, which was promising. This makes
it even more disappointing that the reconstruction progress has been slow, despite the availability of extensive
resources (Nikhil 2016).
What’s Wrong with Rebuilding Nepal?
The slow progress of post-earthquake reconstruction is
in part the result of deeper socio-political conflicts in the
Nepali society. First, political dysfunction has worsened
in the post-earthquake time, and second, the lack of trust
between the State and NGOs has led to many potential
reconstruction projects being turned down or being
ineffective in responding to local needs. In other words,
post-disaster governance has played a crucial role in the
reconstruction performance.

Political Dysfunction in the Post-Earthquake Context
Since 2006, the year when King Gyanendra’s monarchical
rule collapsed, the new Republic of Nepal has experienced
endless confrontations based on sharply diverging political
and ethnic lines. In July 2008, the Maoist leader, Pushpa
Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), was selected as the first president of the Republic and formed a coalition led by the
Maoist party. However, later the Maoists left the coalition,
politically destabilizing Nepal and leading to frequent
changes in the government due to dismissals and resignations. Although several deadline extensions for drafting
the new constitution had been made, the political parties
could not reach a consensus (Jaiswal 2016). In particular,
Madheshi-based parties from the lowland Tarai region
had asked for more representation in the parliament and
refused to support the proposed constitution.
This conflict about a new constitution continued after the
earthquake. In September 2015, Kathmandu-based political parties reached an accord and finally drafted the new
constitution, however, they failed to gain support from
the Madheshi groups from the Tarai region who have long
been fighting for greater autonomy. This impasse led to
unexpected four-month-long fuel blockades, and protests
in Tarai escalated and became increasingly violent. The
fuel blockade eviscerated Nepal’s energy supply, further
impacting earthquake victims who could not get essential necessities, such as medical supplies and fuel. Nepal’s
economy was also badly hit by the earthquake and later by
the fuel crisis; tourism took a massive hit because of this
double crisis. High transportation costs also limited reconstruction progress as much reconstruction work had to be
suspended. Facing the increasing social turmoil and political uncertainty, many NGOs decided to finish their disaster
relief work in Nepal earlier by December 2015 and gave up
the long-term recovery and reconstruction projects.
Little Gets Done Without a Reconstruction Policy
Effective reconstruction policy must go hand in hand with
good governance, which has been clearly discussed in the
literature on disaster governance. Empirical examples
indicate that effective coordination between the State and
NGOs helps to overcome the relief and recovery challenges
to those resource-poor countries (e.g. the earthquake in
Turkey on August 17, 1999). Civil society’s involvement
strengthens the community’s resilience to future disasters
(e.g. the earthquakes in Sichuan on May 12, 2008 and on
April 20, 2013). Disasters can also transform the society on
multiple levels. For instance, the 1995 Kobe earthquake
directly caused the development of civil society organizations in Japan because the public believed that these
HIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 2 | 77

organizations could react to the disasters more effectively
than the State. All these empirical cases show that the
involvement of civil society in post-disaster management
is positive, however, civic cooperation does not appear in
a vacuum; it relies on state policy (Jalai 2002). There is no
doubt that the government plays a key role in post-disaster
recovery, but the level of state intervention is debatable.
Two major reconstruction experiences—Hurricane Katrina
(Chamelee-Wright and Storr 2009) and the Indian Ocean
Tsunami (Aldrich 2010; 2011)3—show that government
intervention may not necessarily be good and that some
policies may adversely affect the recovery process. The
complicated state-led reconstruction policies often cause
significant delay and encourage disaster-affected communities to take a wait-and-see attitude. Consequently,
the community’s revitalization is undermined in this
post-disaster time (Chamlee-Wright and Rothschild 2007;
Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009). Chamlee-Wright and
Storr (2009) also find that the state’s promises are often
unrealistic, which can exacerbate pessimistic expectations
among the affected communities if the rebuilding work is
slow. They conclude that, in contrast with a state where
power is centralized, the coordinated relationship between
key stakeholders, including the state, local NGOs, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and local
communities, is the key to better recovery. They argue the
role of the state is to create mechanisms for disaster-affected communities to self-recover by reinforcing their
local knowledge and community resources.
Nepal has faced many governance challenges in the
post-disaster period. Political dysfunction resulted in a
serious delay in the establishment of a reconstruction
authority. During the Donor Conference in June 2015, the
Nepali government promised to establish the National
Reconstruction Authority (NRA). This authority was
supposed to oversee all reconstruction work including eligibility assessment, project approval and policy
implementation. It was also responsible for coordinating, guiding and supporting the activities of ministries,
local authorities and partner organizations (HRRP 2017).
Despite the crucial need for the establishment of the NRA,
the authority was only established in January 2016 after
several delays. During these eight months from June to
January, Nepal was left without an official national reconstruction policy. The delay in establishing the NRA clearly
reflected the struggle between divergent political parties.
Pokharel and Wagle (2016) point out that the politicization
of the bureaucracy in Nepal was a serious issue and that
most of the civil servants were affiliated with the ruling
party. The NRA became another way for the major political
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parties to fight for control, specifically over the reconstruction fund. As a result, a consensus among different
parties of who should lead the NRA was hard to reach.
Even after the NRA was finally created in January 2016,
its function was criticized by the public (Nikhil 2016).
It was severely understaffed and most positions were
‘under recruitment.’ Consequently, the release of new
building codes and reconstruction policies was severely
delayed. The decision-making process was criticized for
its lack of accountability and transparency (Parajuli 2016).
For example, after the NRA took over all reconstruction
responsibilities, the Nepali government and its foreign
partners rejected the previous census conducted by the
Central Bureau of Statistics in the eleven most affected
districts due to the worry of ‘misappropriation of funds’
by ‘fake’ earthquake victims. Huge money was spent for
‘advance technologies’ and ‘technical manpower’ (mostly
engineers) on a reassessment effort. Parajuli criticizes
that the public was never informed about the trade-off
involved. Furthermore, according to the Aid and Recovery in
Post-Earthquake Nepal report (The Asia Foundation 2016a),
coordination between the NRA, officials in the district and
village officials is rare. The local NRA offices and district offices were often confused about their actual roles
and duties due to frequent changes in national (central)
level guidelines. It appeared that central-level guidelines
weren’t flexible enough to respond to district-level realities, and it was difficult to adjust these guidelines and to
develop local reconstruction policies (The Asia Foundation
2016b). This top-down approach, along with the government’s inability to function properly, resulted in only a few
houses being rebuilt the year after the earthquake.
Apart from the delayed reconstruction policy, this reconstruction strategy fails to respond to local complexities.
Equality is the most important reconstruction principle
for the Nepali government’s post-earthquake response.
An unjust reconstruction policy could further escalate the
tense ethnic divisions and anxieties following the earthquake, therefore the Nepali government has enforced a
limit on housing grants, and to avoid duplication of relief
and reconstruction efforts it has retained all decision-making power for reconstruction projects. Influenced by the
approaches used by the State Government of Gujarat to
rebuild following the 2001 earthquake in India, and the
advice from the World Bank, the government of Nepal
decided an owner-driven approach would be the most
effective and culturally sensitive way to rebuild private
houses (National Planning Commission 2015). However,
what government officials promote as equality, in reality,
does not mean equality for everyone, especially the

poor who have difficulty accessing adequate information from local officials. According to the recent report
Building Inequality by Amnesty International (2017), the
‘owner-driven’ housing reconstruction program, which
requires proof of land ownership as a condition for house
owners to qualify to receive housing grants, did not
address Nepal’s history of feudal land tenure systems
and local informal tenure relationships. As a result, the
most disadvantaged groups, including the landless, were
excluded from this housing scheme.
In addition, the Nepali government enforced a housing
grant policy that capped grants at a certain amount and
did not allow additional top-up grants for marginalized
communities. All eligible households in rural areas could
receive NRs. 300,000 ($3,000 USD) in three installments if
their rebuilt houses complied with the building requirements. A staff member from one Taiwan-based NGO
explained to us why their organization finally gave up on
their housing reconstruction project, “It is hard for us to
work because villagers have to choose to get help from the
government or us, not both. Two Lakh Rupees [approx.
US$2,000] is a big amount for the rural poor. Villagers
don’t want to lose the grant opportunity.” Without more
intervention from NGOs and the State, the owner-driven
approach simply means that those with the resources can
build safe houses, but the poor never can. Consequently,
most of the rural poor continue to live in uninhabitable
temporary shelters, and their hopes of rebuilding their
houses seems to be fading.
Wait-and-See Attitudes among Earthquake-Affected
Communities
Another critical challenge in the post-earthquake scenario
is the lack of trust between NGOs and the government of
Nepal. In our discussions with national and international
non-governmental aid (NGOs/INGOs) workers, respondents stated that they were confused about the frequent
changes in the reconstruction policy and admitted that the
one-door system where all reconstruction projects had get
approval from NRA weakened their autonomy.
On September 9, 2016, when we were on our way to meet
officers from an INGO, we suddenly heard the news that
the newly-appointed Prime Minister, Pushpa Kamal
Dahal, had proposed to increase the housing grant from
NRs. 200,000 to NRs. 300,000. Together with a proposed
low interest rate loan, the new housing package for each
eligible household would be up to NRs. 800,000. The
INGO officers were shocked and suspected this may be
just another ploy to obtain popularity, as it did not seem

realistic in a poor country like Nepal. One officer asserted
that “this amount is huge even for people living in an
urban area like Kathmandu.” He was worried that the
increase in the housing grant would not help to speed up
the house rebuilding process: “Some people actually can
manage to rebuild houses by themselves. However, the
hope for getting more and more housing grants makes
everyone take a wait-and-see attitude and solely depend
on government. This is one of reasons for the severe delay
in housing reconstruction.” At the end of September 2016,
the NRA announced that over 80% enrolled beneficiaries
(361,575 out of 455,710) received the first housing grant
installment. According to our observations in the Dhading
district (one of the 11 most earthquake-devastated
districts), even though most villagers had received the
housing grant, active rebuilding had not yet commenced.
Some villagers told us they used the money for food
purchases and festival celebration. Many villagers also
mentioned that they did not have sufficient knowledge to
build earthquake-resilient houses.
Government: “NGO Fund is Also a Government Fund”
The direct involvement of NGOs and INGOs in housing
reconstruction is very rare. Most NGOs and INGOs in
Nepal have allocated their funds to public infrastructure,
masonry and carpentry training programs, and livelihood
improvement activities. This dilemma was prevalent
among NGOs, and in fact, in February 2016 the NRA
requested that NGOs and INGOs not provide financial assistance or building materials directly to villagers because
such organizations could not comply with building codes.
Later, the NRA clarified that NGOs/ INGOs were welcome
to become involved in the house rebuilding sector with the
understanding that the one-door system meant they must
obtain approval from the NRA and sign a Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Nepal
prior to becoming involved. In addition, NGOs were told
that their housing projects should cover one defined and
bounded area (such as a whole village or district). The
NRA also notified the NGOs that no reconstruction projects should target a particular community based on caste,
ethnicity or religion as this may harm national, caste,
religious and ethnic sensitivities, and undermine the
government’s sovereignty. According to the Mobilization of
NGOs for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Procedure Guideline
issued in April 2016, there must be no duplication of aid
efforts, which means earthquake victims cannot receive
financial assistance from both the government and NGOs.
One politician explained to us that when the NGO signs
a MoU, the project becomes a government project, “NGO
fund is also the government’s fund,” said the official.
HIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 2 | 79

The NRA has encouraged NGOs and INGOs to deposit
funds for private house reconstruction in the NRA’s
Reconstruction Fund. During interviews, high-ranking government officials pointed out that the one-door system is
necessary to avoid poor NGO governance in the post-earthquake context. While the number of NGOs and INGOs in
Nepal has increased dramatically in the past three decades,
their governance has long been questioned due to their
lack of transparency in the monitoring and evaluation of
project expenses and of their general activities (Dhakal
2007). This explains why the guideline requires at least 80%
of an organization’s total project budget to be allocated to
project activities, not staff salaries and traveling expenses,
which is fair. However, this attempt to avoid corruption
and mismanagement in NGOs has resulted in many NGOs
simply giving up on their house rebuilding plans, or allocating funds to other recovery activities. It is estimated
that less than 2% of the rebuilding of private houses will be
supported by non-governmental organizations.
The NGOs are very suspicious of the one-door reconstruction approach in Nepal. Some NGOs are concerned
that they will not be able to be accountable to their
donors for donations that are managed by the Nepali
government. In March 2016, we visited one influential
NGO that had planned to help poor villagers rebuild their
houses, but had changed their plans when negotiations
with the government broke down. One of the reasons
these negotiations halted was that this NGO was asked
to rebuild the entire district, but the NGO simply did not
have the ability to do so. The NGO was concerned about
handing over donations to the government. The NGO
officer pointed out that safe shelter for affected villagers
should be the top priority, but it was difficult to deal with
the bureaucracy. Finally, the decision was made to allocate
funding to less controversial reconstruction sectors, such
as education, health and water facilities. Five months later,
the officer told us that the MoU with the Nepali government was finally signed. According to the MoU, the NGO
would provide financial support to 8,000 households in
four districts to rebuild their houses and the government
had the right to decide the beneficiaries and oversee
grant disbursement.
Under the equality principle, these 8,000 households would
receive the same housing grant amount as other earthquake-affected households. The NGO was also responsible
for providing the masonry and carpentry training for
villagers. The officer admitted the agreement was not
perfect. First, the NGO lost the authority to decide who
would be the beneficiaries of their funds and how much
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they would be granted. Second, the NGOs presence was
limited because the beneficiaries did not know the support
they received originated from the NGO, not the State.
The senior officer further explained that to increase the
level of accountability, the NGO would carry out some
social communication campaigns to inform villagers
of their right to appeal if they encountered any unfairness in receiving the housing grant. The NGO had hoped
that through its training programs, more villagers could
develop enough knowledge to rebuild their houses. The
senior officer admitted that although the first housing
grant installment was released, at least 30% of beneficiaries, such as female heads of households, the elderly and
extremely poor families would not be able to rebuild their
homes. He commented that in the past NGOs had the independence to implement more holistic social development
projects, but after the earthquake, they lost this power.
For example, they felt the housing grant was inadequate
for villagers to rebuild their houses, and thus proposed
giving an extra grant to cover the costs of transportation;
however, the government rejected this proposal based on
the principle of equality for all.
Lack of Long-term NGO Commitment and Coordination
Based on our year-long observation, we noticed that the
poor performance of some NGOs (both local and international) also led to the slow reconstruction progress. Most
NGOs are involved in masonry training programs, however
the quality and effectiveness of these programs is a serious
concern. Some NGOs offered only three-day masonry
training programs, and the instructors did not even have
any knowledge on how to build better and safe houses. We
discussed this issue with a Japan-funded NGO that carried
out several housing reconstruction training programs in
rural areas. The staff members explained that due to the
lack of funding, they did not have a follow-up action plan
after the completion of model houses. They were optimistic that the government-housing grant was enough for
villagers to rebuild houses despite the increasing cost of
transportation, building materials, and labor in rural areas.
Rebuilding schools was another top priority in earthquake-affected districts where NGOs were actively
engaged. We witnessed that some NGOs perceived the
project sites as their ‘territories’ and refused to coordinate
with other NGOs. For example, after a long discussion
with locals, and having received approval from the local
officials, our NGO decided to rebuild a small community
school in Katunge since education was severely affected
for months after the disaster. However, after we delivered

some basic building materials to the school, we received a
call from another foreign-funded NGO claiming they were
the only authorized organization to rebuild all schools in
the region. The NGO even contacted the schoolteachers
to request they terminate the rebuild project with us by
offering them ‘better deals’ (meaning that no financial
or in-kind contribution from locals would be necessary).
Consequently, we stopped the project and removed all
building materials. As a local and volunteer-based NGO,
we did not have enough human resources to look for a
new beneficial school. This story illustrates that if better
coordination existed among NGOs, we could distribute
resources wisely and widely so that more schools could be
benefited faster.
The sustainability of the top-down reconstruction
approach has been a serious concern. In our two-year
observation, the coordination between the State, the NGOs
and INGOs, as well as local communities, has been very
limited. Instead of simply offering financial resources in
an efficient way, we believe that good governance and
effective coordination will determine whether Nepal can
be rebuild. Our NGO experience in post-disaster reconstruction clearly demonstrates that there is reason hope
for revitalization as well as immense hopelessness.
Hope and Hopelessness: Future Village Housing
Reconstruction Experiences
The earthquake caused extensive damage in the rural villages outside of Kathmandu, and the Future Village project
area was no exception. All the houses had collapsed, and

some people were killed. Most local school buildings were
destroyed, villagers had no shelter and were forced to
sleep in the fields while it rained. There was a severe food
and water shortage, and immediate assistance from the
large humanitarian organizations was not forthcoming.
The events of the initial days following the earthquake
were discouraging for everyone in the village.
Despite these drawbacks, the community responded rather
quickly. In the first two months, by working together the
villagers managed to build a community center, a temporary school and over 100 temporary shelters. The initial
response of our organization after the earthquake was to
provide emergency relief, which included emergency cash,
funding for the new community building, rice and grain
distribution, emergency supplies and materials, such as
fertilizers, to ensure a normal planting season. These combined efforts ensured that community members were safe
in such a way that they could have positive attitudes about
rebuilding their lives.
Moving Ahead in Uncertain Times
What became clear in the first few weeks after the earthquake was that it would be unlikely for large INGOs to offer
support to Katunge Village. At the same time, we noticed
that the way in which people were working together voluntarily both yielded positive outcomes and was the kind
of mobilization that was needed to encourage people to
start working together towards community revitalization.
Therefore, soon after the earthquake we decided to launch
a reconstruction project called The Chance Initiative
Figure 1. Villagers erect steel
house frames under professional
supervision.
(Atelier-3 x Design For People,
2016)

HIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 2 | 81

Figure 2. Rebuilt earthquakeresistant two-story local house.
(Lam, 2016)

that would not only provide the resources necessary for
rebuilding the village, but would also encourage people to
mobilize in ways that would simultaneously lead to stronger community cohesion.
In the months that followed, we established partnerships with several organizations and produced a strategy
to rebuild earthquake-resistant houses in Katunge. In
short, we designed an earthquake resistant steel frame,4
which could be distributed among the affected families.
Architects and engineers from our partner organizations
would provide free training to the community on how to
erect the steel frames, the necessary foundation for the
frames, and how to build the rest of the house according
to government regulations. Apart from the steel frame,
the materials to build the walls, roofs and floors could be
sourced from the surrounding environment and the house
could be built in accordance with cultural and traditional
knowledge and customs.
Meanwhile, our organization took on the responsibility
of mobilizing local people, leading the project and partly
financing it through our global donor network. Several
fundraising campaigns had already helped us to raise sufficient donation funds to finance the building of the first
batch of houses by the end of 2015. We planned to use this
budget to support affected families as follows: our organization would finance the steel frames (the most expensive
part of the house that makes it seismic-resistant) and the
foundation, while the families would be responsible for the
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cost of the remaining materials and were obliged to voluntarily help other families (exchange labor) in setting up
the frame and building the walls and rooves on their own
homes. In this way, we could ensure that more families
could be supported, labor costs would stay at a minimum
for the families, and that each family could decide freely
which materials it wanted to use in addition to the steel
frame.
In August 2015, we first presented our plan to the local
community. At that time, our plan was met with great
enthusiasm and support from the villagers. A local reconstruction committee was also formed to coordinate this
rebuilding work.
Implementing Reconstruction
As the community agreed with the implementation of our
reconstruction project, we decided to ship the first batch
of steel frames from China (the only country close to Nepal
where such frames are currently made) to Katunge in
December 2015. During this period, we first encountered
the political dysfunction in the post-earthquake period: as
there was no policy established for reconstruction projects,
the authorities were not willing to allow our frames to enter
Nepal at the border. In the days that followed, it was difficult
to talk to the authorities, and the responses they gave us
were contradictory. In the end, we finally gained approval to
transport the frames into Nepal, however, we were fined a
heavy tax as the customs office was only willing to approve

it as ‘commercial goods.’ The frames eventually arrived in
the village in early January 2016.
It was also during this period that we visited the village
again and started to notice that the opinion of some villagers about our reconstruction project had changed. Rumors
had started to spread that the Nepali government was
planning to distribute funds to earthquake-affected families
soon. As the villagers had heard about the difficulties we
were experiencing with transporting the steel frame, some
villagers expressed that they preferred to wait for the government grant instead of starting to rebuild their houses.
Some others—especially those who were more skeptical of
the government’s promise—preferred to work with us to
reconstruct their homes.
In the months that followed, we trained villagers how to
rebuild their houses using the steel frame, and the first few
houses were being built. Some of the families did exchange
labor, while others with more means decided to hire skilled
workers. At this stage, some villagers were unwilling to
participate in the exchange of capital or help voluntarily
because they became unsure whether they themselves
wanted a steel frame, and thus were skeptical whether they
would get free labor in return if they waited.
Later, we had consultations with the local community to
discuss the need for another batch of steel frames to the
village. It was around this time that the government had
also announced the amount of money the earthquake-affected families would be entitled to and the criteria for
receiving such support. Villagers split into two groups:
some preferred to rebuild their houses faster and requested
we order more steel frames, but most chose to wait for the
government’s support. We also noticed that most of the
villagers did not understand the conditions for receiving
such government support. They were under the impression that the government would give them a sum of money
upfront as the first installment and were unfamiliar with the
condition that they had to rebuild their house in accordance
with the building codes to receive the next installment of
support. Nevertheless, 20 families eventually decided to
accept the support from our organization; the community
selected those families to receive steel frames in April 2016.
Our organization also approached different government
officials, and despite their promise to support us, nothing
was achieved.
Finally, in April 2016, the Nepali government established a
policy that made it clear that families who had received or
would receive support from NGOs to rebuild their houses
would be ineligible to receive the government’s support.
The new policy resulted in more and more people taking a

wait-and-see attitude: they would not rebuild anything until
the government distributed money. As a result of this policy
most families spent another monsoon season in temporary
shelters.
Around April 2016, it also became clear that NGO’s were no
longer allowed to operate without obtaining an approval
for their reconstruction projects from the NRA. Therefore,
we decided to obtain the government’s approval before we
shipped a third batch of steel frames. In the months that
followed, we used our resources to approach district officials
to tell them about our initiative to help villagers rebuild
their homes, and to request government approval. However,
district officials did not show any interest in supporting our
house rebuilding project. In one meeting, a high-ranking
official pointed out that the Nepali government was not
interested in ‘candy-type’ small-scale rebuilding projects as
he described. He also mentioned that the district government did not have any power to make decisions. He directed
us to contact the NRA, stating: “If you get the NRA approval,
then we can look at your project.” He also emphasized
that without such approval, helping villagers to rebuild
houses would be “illegal.” When asked how to make the
project legal, he failed to provide useful guidance. During
the meeting, he did not even look at our proposal. Later, we
were told that any reconstruction project must first get the
district government’s support before contacting the NRA.
Despite continued efforts to obtain government support,
we have neither heard anything back from local government officials nor from the NRA. This has made it difficult
for our organization to make long-term plans. Indeed, their
bureaucratic-bureaucracy, which included inconsistent
information, as well as unclear systems, procedures, delays,
and negative responses from reconstruction authorities,
discouraged many NGOs like ours from continuing to contribute to the post-earthquake revitalization effort.
Two years have now passed since the earthquake hit Nepal
and since we first started to contribute to its revitalization,
we have helped to build 27 earthquake resistant houses, one
temporary school, one community center, one multi-purpose education center and seven earthquake resistant
classrooms. We still have funding left to build a few more
houses, but it is difficult to plan what further steps we can
take due to the lack of government support, complicated
bureaucratic processes and changing attitudes among the
villagers who are largely affected by the shifting sands of
the State’s policy. As a result, we also cannot do additional
fundraising because of our precarious position.
Most families who received the steel frames have now
completed their houses. In the meantime, many other
families have received the first installment of the governHIMALAYA Volume 37, Number 2 | 83

ment’s support. But, after the first screening round, most
families failed to comply with building codes, and hence
are unsure whether they will ever receive the second
installment or be able to complete the reconstruction.
During our last visit to Katunge in April 2017, we noticed
that opinions about how to continue rebuilding the village
have become more diverse. Some families are still confident that they will receive further governmental support,
while others have become increasingly skeptical of this
approach. Some families have decided to start building
new houses that are not earthquake resistant, and because
they decided it better than the shelter that they had been
living in for over two years. Others continue to take a waitand-see attitude and cannot foresee building a new house
anytime soon. For those families, another monsoon season
in a temporary shelter lies ahead.
Conclusion
In this case study, we have documented the post-earthquake reality of a rural project area involving a grassroots
NGO. We have highlighted some of the challenges of
this project, and have interwoven several recommendations into our discussion for future policy-makers. Our
reconstruction experience clearly demonstrates that the
dominance of government control, bureaucracy, lack of
long-term commitment among NGOs as well as the villagers’ wait-and-see attitudes all undermine the capacity of
the community’s ability to rebound. In a resource-poor
village like Katunge, civic participation from villagers,
NGOs and private sectors are the key for post-disaster
recovery. We suggest that the Nepali government should
have a more encouraging framework to govern NGOs and
an attitude to let the NGOs do what they need to do, so that
they can mobilize others to help the local residents rebuild
their communities.
The more time passes without things being done, the
fewer opportunities Nepali people will have to rebuild
their homes safely. It has been argued that the people are
always happy and satisfied with whatever they have or
can get, and it does not matter whether they are living
in temporary shelters. However, natural disasters always
go beyond what we can predict, especially if no action is
taken. Then the poor are subjected to suffer more. While
earthquakes are natural phenomena, their effects are not.
Houses collapse because they are not seismic-resistant. We
need to build them so that they will survive well into the
future. We talk about equality in rebuilding, but not about
justice for the most vulnerable. These man-made aspects
of the disaster that hinder revitalization of communities
after natural calamities can only be resolved when all
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social institutions work together cohesively to create a
better human society. By mobilizing earthquake victims,
it is possible to rebuild houses and revitalize communities;
conversely, little progress to rebuild Nepal can be made so
long as both poor governance, and poor or no coordination
between major reconstruction actors, prevail.
Postscript
After two years, the reconstruction process remains
onerous. Out of the 750 affected national heritage sites,
the NRA has completed the reconstruction of 20, while
132 are still under construction. In the private housing
sector, 554,996 households (86% of eligible households)
have received their first reconstruction installment, 14,466
households have been verified for their second installment, and 595 households for their third installment. As
of April 21, 2017, only 22,234 houses have been completed,
which accounts for only 3.5% of the total rebuild target
(National Reconstruction Authority 2017). To tackle the
extremely low housing rebuild rate, the NRA has deployed
more than 2,000 engineers and assistant sub-engineers to
the villages to provide technical assistance and conduct
inspections. On May 15, 2017, the NRA issued its first
ever appeal urging I/NGOs, the private sector, and philanthropic organizations to expand support for these
vulnerable communities by providing top up grants of NRs.
50,000 and/or technical assistance. All these are positive
signs that the authority recognizes the social dynamics
of earthquake victims and their communities, and that it
also notices the need for more flexibility in reconstruction
policies.
In addition, local elections were held in 34 districts on May
14, 2017 for the first time since Nepal’s new constitution
was promulgated in September 2015. The local level has
been without people’s representatives since 2002. We hope
these 34,203 directly-elected representatives will give
local communities a louder voice in national decisions.
Particularly, in the earthquake affected districts, elected
local representatives can have the independent authority
to mobilize local resources to make the decision faster.
They can also monitor reconstruction efforts against the
misuse of funds. We hope these elected representatives
can play a more active role in building stronger connections between the central government, citizens and donor
agencies. Good governance is the key to rebuilding and
revitalizing Nepal.
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Endnotes
1. On March 10, 2017, the Nepali government has adopted
a 744 local body system, fulfilling the requirement of the
new constitution of Nepal that was established in 2015.
All old municipalities and villages (of which there were
more than 3,900) were restructured to total only 744 new
Municipalities and Villages. Katunge village, together with
Marpak and Semjong, have been merged into ‘Netrawati
Gaunpalika (Netrawati Rural Municipality)’ (The Himalayan
Times 2017). Although the old Katunge village doesn’t exist
any longer, we still refer to it as ‘Katunge’ throughout the
paper as this is what we and the villagers are familiar with.

2. Since the earthquake, the tourism industry has also
fallen very low due to the damage to famous world
heritage tourist sites and the fear of an earthquake. Nepal
received 251,148 fewer tourists in 2015, representing a
sharp drop of 31.78 percent, compared to the 2014 figure
(Nepal Economic Forum 2016; Prasain 2016; Thapa 2016).
The fall of tourism arrival has not only affected the hotel
business but it also severely damaged the business of
vendors who ran small and local business in the famous
visiting sites.
3. Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast on August 29,
2005. Over 80% of the city of New Orleans was flooded and
estimated property damage was over 125 billion USD. The
death toll was 1,836, and 15 million people were evacuated
from their homes. The Indian Ocean Tsunami happened on
December 26, 2004, and it killed over 230,000 people in 14
countries.
4. Our anti-seismic house design is a lightweight steel
structure with a solid stone foundation. The steel frame is
designed with diagonal bracing and double beam systems,
which connect each column with horizontal beams in
both directions to reduce the column slenderness ratio,
thereby resisting the horizontal seismic loads. The main
steel frame components are pre-fabricated in China and
transported to the village for installation. This lightweight
steel frame structure could simple be established by bolts
and nuts that enable the villages to erect the frame easily.
Alternatively, sometimes due to the family’s economic
situation, their small family size, or the location of their
land, the steel frame structure is not suitable. In such
cases, a traditional home can be built using stone, clay
and cement using simple architectural techniques to
make it safer in the event of an earthquake. Our initiative
presented these alternative structure designs to the local
community.
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